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Government Policies, Smuggling, 
and the Informal Sector
By Stephen Golub
Th e informal sector in West Africa has become increasingly internationalized 
in the last few decades. Th is chapter explores informal cross-border trade—
that is, smuggling—in West Africa, focusing on Senegal and Benin. According 
to offi  cial trade data, regional trade fl ows are minimal despite the West Afri-
can Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) regional trading agreements. In fact, however, 
smuggling is fl ourishing in West Africa, refl ecting artifi cial national boundar-
ies imposed in the colonial period, the strong ethnic ties transcending these 
borders, which are described in chapter 8, the inability to police entry and exit 
points, and diff ering economic policies in neighboring countries that create 
incentives to engage in smuggling. 
Th is chapter illustrates the complex interplay between formal and informal 
aspects of international trade in West Africa. Much of regional trade is con-
ducted by the large informal fi rms described in chapter 4. Indeed one of the 
most important industries controlled by the informal sector, as pointed out in 
chapter 3, is commerce, which includes cross-border transactions. Th e demar-
cation between domestic and foreign trading is very fl uid in Africa. Regional 
exchange in traditional local food staples such as millet predates present 
national borders. Other bulk foodstuff s consumed in West Africa, such as rice, 
sugar, and wheat, are largely imported from Asia, Europe, and North America 
and then distributed around the region. Large informal enterprises are inti-
mately involved throughout the distribution process and interact in complex 
ways with formal importers and shipping companies such as Balloré, Maersk, 
and Grimaldi. Cash crops and petroleum extracted in Nigeria are also distrib-
uted in West Africa through informal circuits. In short, there are numerous 
connections between smuggling (illegal trade) and the informal sector (actors 
Th is chapter draws on Golub and Mbaye (2009) and Golub (2008). 
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operating illegally). Th is chapter highlights weaknesses in the institutional envi-
ronment that contribute to the fl ourishing of informal trade, notably trade poli-
cies and customs management. Chapter 6 reviews the institutional weaknesses 
that foster informality, highlighting the central role of customs. Corruption and 
bureaucracy at customs open the door to smuggling activities of large infor-
mal fi rms (chapter 4) and kinship networks (chapter 8). Smuggling, in turn, 
exacerbates the informalization of West African economies directly by serving 
as an important avenue for entrepreneurship, employment, and income and 
indirectly by promoting a culture of corruption and tax evasion.
Historical Background 
Intra-African trade has been shaped by a long history. Traditional long- and 
short-distance trading routes predated the colonial era. Th e colonial powers 
created artifi cial borders within regions with long-standing ethnic and cultural 
ties. Upon independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the new governments oft en 
pursued erratic and widely divergent trade and exchange rate policies. Large 
diff erences in rates of protection between countries provided an impetus for 
smuggling, which was facilitated by the weak enforcement abilities of African 
governments, the cultural and ethnic connections among people in these arbi-
trarily defi ned countries, and the trading traditions among them (Berg 1985; 
Egg and Herrera 1998), as also discussed in chapter 8 of this volume.
Th e study of smuggling in Africa has focused mostly on whether or not this 
trade is benefi cial. Azam (2007) provides an overview of the literature on the 
welfare eff ects of smuggling. In an early contribution, Bhagwati and Hansen 
(1973) emphasize the waste of resources associated with smuggling activi-
ties, but Deardorff  and Stolper (1990) point out that smuggling is a response 
to severe policy distortions and can alleviate those distortions. Relatively few 
studies have attempted to document the magnitude and determinants of smug-
gling in Africa. 
Prior to the colonial era, states in Africa were not characterized by hard 
geographic borders, with rulers having only weak control over the territory and 
movements of people (Herbst 2000, ch. 2). At the Berlin conference of 1884–85, 
the colonial powers divided up Africa among themselves, creating territorial 
borders based on their de facto zones of control. Th ese boundaries arbitrarily 
separated regions with long-standing ethnic ties and oft en without clear geo-
graphic separators (Young 1994). 
As illogical and porous as colonial borders were, they remained the basis 
for national boundaries following the end of colonialism in the early 1960s. 
Initiatives to consolidate countries into regional unions, including between Th e 
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Gambia and Senegal, have failed due to the unwillingness of national political 
elites to cede authority (Herbst 2000). 
Moreover, the newly independent postcolonial nation-states developed their 
own national economic policies, including monetary and fi scal policies, but, 
more oft en than not, these policies were wielded irresponsibly in the fi rst few 
decades of independence. Trade policies were of particular importance, as they 
served both to protect local industries and to generate government revenues 
(Berg 1985). Taxes on international trade have historically provided an unusu-
ally large portion of government revenues in Africa, dating back to the colonial 
period and continuing to the present day. Direct taxes on income and wealth 
are diffi  cult to enforce in Africa due to lack of state control over much of the 
population (Herbst 2000, 116). Th e prevalence of the informal sector also limits 
the scope for direct taxation, as discussed in chapter 3. In addition, many coun-
tries, particularly those pursuing import substitution strategies most vigorously, 
have adopted very high import barriers, including tariff s and import prohibi-
tions. Th e high levels of protection have impeded legal trade within Africa and 
provided large incentives for smuggling. 
Regional integration has so far done little to promote legal trade within 
Africa or to staunch smuggling. Th ere are some 30 regional blocs in Africa, and, 
on average, each of the 53 countries on the continent is a member of four oft en-
overlapping groups (Yang and Gupta 2005). Yet offi  cial intra-African trade fl ows 
remain very low. Excluding South Africa, intra-African trade accounts for less 
than 10  percent of total African exports and imports. Regional integration 
has failed to promote offi  cial trade for several reasons. First, in many regional 
groups, notably the ECOWAS, eff ective harmonization of policies has been very 
limited. Nigeria, in particular, has fl outed ECOWAS agreements on harmoniz-
ing external tariff s and removing barriers to trade within the group. Second, 
regional integration has been asymmetric between francophone and anglo-
phone countries. Francophone countries have achieved much deeper integra-
tion. Th e WAEMU countries have formed a customs union, but this agreement 
is confi ned to the francophone countries of West Africa, leaving out contiguous 
anglophone countries, including Th e Gambia and Nigeria, which are members 
of ECOWAS but not WAEMU. Consequently, large disparities in trade policies 
remain the rule between countries sharing porous borders and weak enforce-
ment capabilities. Th e Gambia—a tiny anglophone country of 1.5 million peo-
ple completely surrounded by francophone Senegal except for a 60-kilometer 
border on the Atlantic Ocean—is a case in point. Despite the geographic and 
cultural ties that link them, political and economic cooperation between Sen-
egal and Th e Gambia has been minimal. Likewise, Benin and Nigeria have made 
no eff orts to harmonize economic policies despite their long-shared border and 
long-standing ethnic ties between their people.
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Overview of The Gambia-Senegal and Benin-Nigeria 
Informal Trading 
Informal trade activities involve three types of fl ows (INSAE 2001): smuggling 
of imports from other continents, usually entering through the port without 
being recorded, exports and imports of locally produced products within the 
region, and unoffi  cial reexports of legally imported products. In Th e Gambia, 
reexports are the dominant activity, whereas in Benin, informal trade takes all 
three forms. Th e focus here is mostly on reexports.
Reexporting involves importing goods and subsequently shipping them to 
other countries with no additional processing or packaging, except for trans-
port services. Th e Gambia’s reexport activities to Senegal are similar to those 
of Benin to Nigeria. In the 1960s and 1970s, Senegal and Nigeria developed 
ineffi  cient import-substituting manufacturing industries behind high import 
barriers. Th e Gambia and Benin have never developed a signifi cant industrial 
base and have evolved into entrepôt economies with development strategies 
designed to undercut the trade policies of their more protectionist neighbors. 
Th e only other signifi cant export industries aside from smuggling in these two 
countries are declining primary products (groundnuts in Th e Gambia and cot-
ton in Benin) and tourism. In both countries since the early 1970s, the authori-
ties have sought to maintain trade taxes below those of neighboring countries 
in a deliberate attempt to foster reexports to their larger neighbors. Th e Gambia 
and Benin have become highly dependent on their entrepôt services, especially 
for government revenues. In both cases, the relationship involves a francophone 
member and an anglophone nonmember of WAEMU, but the roles are reversed 
in the two cases (francophone Senegal and anglophone Nigeria are protection-
ist, while anglophone Th e Gambia and francophone Benin are more liberal).
Th e reexport trade straddles the formal and informal sectors in a highly 
complex and well-organized system that operates quite similarly in diff erent 
countries. Reexports involve large formal enterprises that import goods through 
offi  cial channels and a sophisticated distribution chain that engages in trans-
shipment through informal mechanisms. Reexports are a major contributor to 
government revenues in Th e Gambia and Benin, because imported goods des-
tined for reexport generally pay duties when entering the country before being 
smuggled out. Consequently, trade taxes are even more important for these two 
countries than for most other African countries, accounting for about half of 
both countries’ tax revenues. 
Th e commodities involved in reexportation are highly diverse and vary over 
time, but consist predominantly of imports of basic consumer goods originat-
ing from Asia, Europe, or the United States and sold to average African low- 
or middle-income households. Goods enter through the port of Banjul in Th e 
Gambia and Cotonou in Benin before being reexported to Senegal and Nigeria, 
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respectively, as well as to other countries in the region, to a lesser extent. Th e 
main products are bulk food items such as rice, sugar, and fl our; processed 
foods such as tomato paste, cooking oil, condensed and canned milk, tea, and 
soft  drinks; fabric of various sorts; used cars; and other basic household items 
such as batteries, candles, and matches. 
Cross-border trade of locally produced goods is also important, especially 
for Benin. A very large proportion of many agricultural and manufactured 
goods consumed in Benin are imported from Nigeria, according to fi eldwork 
done by the research institute LARES and reported in INSAE (2001). Petroleum 
products in particular are imported almost entirely from Nigeria, motivated by 
the subsidized prices in that country. In some cases, manufactured goods pro-
duced in Nigeria are more competitive in neighboring countries such as Benin 
than imports from Asia, especially since they escape duties when smuggled 
into Benin. According to our interviewees, however, imports of manufactured 
products from Nigeria have declined in recent years. Th ere is also substantial 
unrecorded trade in locally produced agricultural commodities in Benin.
Th e overall structure of merchandise trade for Th e Gambia and Benin is 
shown in table 9.1, which combines offi  cial data with estimates of unoffi  cial 
trade fl ows, all as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). In both coun-
tries, offi  cial merchandise exports are very small relative to imports, having 
dropped steadily since the 1970s. Th ese declines in merchandise exports are 
Table 9.1 Official Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transit in The Gambia and Benin, 2004–07
% of GDP
Country and type of trade 2004 2005 2006 2007
The Gambia
Ofﬁ cial exports 2.5 1.7 2.2 2.0
Ofﬁ cial reexports 1.6 0.1 — —
Goods in transit 2.3 1.4 — —
Ofﬁ cial imports 57.1 51.4 50.8 47.4
Estimated unofﬁ cial imports for reexport 24.1 18.3 17.1 14.3
Estimated unofﬁ cial reexports 32.6 24.7 23.1 19.4
Benin
Ofﬁ cial exports 7.4 5.1 5.0 6.0
Ofﬁ cial reexports 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6
Goods in transit 26.0 30.9 44.3 49.3
Ofﬁ cial imports 22.0 20.6 21.3 26.2
Estimated unofﬁ cial imports for reexport 22.4 23.6 26.6 32.4
Estimated unofﬁ cial reexports 30.2 31.9 35.9 43.7
Sources: Customs and trade statistics for Benin and The Gambia; World Bank 2010.
Note: — = Not available.
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partially off set by increases in service exports (not shown in the table), but they 
also refl ect the growth of unrecorded reexports. Offi  cial imports as a share of 
GDP are very high in Th e Gambia, at more than 50 percent, but are only about 
half of that in Benin. Benin’s offi  cial imports as a share of GDP are also far 
below those of other coastal West African economies such as Senegal, Ghana, 
and Togo.1 Benin’s low import ratio is inconsistent with its acknowledged role 
as a regional entrepôt. Th is contradiction is explained by the failure of offi  cial 
statistics to capture two important dimensions of Benin’s trade: (a) a large vol-
ume of Benin’s imports, particularly petroleum products, are smuggled in from 
Nigeria, and (b) a large volume of imports are classifi ed as in transit, but in fact 
much of these goods in transit, mainly used cars, are not substantially diff erent 
from ordinary imports, insofar as both are diverted to Nigeria and yield signifi -
cant revenues in the process. Overall, a very large portion of imports in both 
Th e Gambia and Benin are not used for domestic consumption but instead are 
transshipped, mostly to Senegal and Nigeria, respectively. 
Operation of Smuggling Networks 
A complex and opaque reexport distribution chain operates in both sets of 
countries in broadly similar ways. Goods are brought into Benin or Th e Gam-
bia by large importers, in some cases operating in the formal sector, and are 
then smuggled across the border through various mechanisms. Th e reexport 
trade has developed a sophisticated infrastructure, in some respects organized 
much more effi  ciently than public infrastructure. Observers in both countries 
allege that high government offi  cials are aware of these activities and are oft en 
involved in organizing and protecting smuggling networks, as they are in much 
of Africa (Egg and Herrera 1998). As such, these networks operate quite openly 
and without fear of government crackdowns.
Th e Gambia and Senegal 
Goods are brought into Th e Gambia by a handful of large wholesale importers, 
many of whom are Lebanese.2 Th e wholesalers then sell much of their merchan-
dise to other traders, oft en Mauritanians, who have shops all along the border 
and who, in turn, sell to small-scale traders, typically “market women,” from 
countries in the region—mainly Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, and, of course, 
Senegal. Th ese petty traders then smuggle the goods into Senegal either by 
going through the bush or by paying off  customs offi  cials at the offi  cial border 
posts. Alternatively, the wholesalers in Banjul sell directly to Senegalese busi-
nessmen who then transport the goods to the frontier in large trucks. Most of 
the truckers are Senegalese nationals. At the border, the trucks are unloaded, 
and the goods are smuggled through in smaller quantities, as described above. 
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Sometimes, the truck crosses the border with the connivance of Senegalese cus-
toms offi  cials. Social, religious, and cultural ties among the participants, nota-
bly through their frequent affi  liation with Mouride Muslim brotherhoods, as 
described in chapter 8, greatly facilitate these transactions. Goods can also be 
brought into Senegal by sea using pirogues operating at night. Th e sprawling 
informal markets in Dakar, notably Sandaga, and in other cities, are substan-
tially supplied by contraband, much of it fl owing from Th e Gambia, with the 
tacit acquiescence of the Senegalese authorities.
Traders estimate that about half of the reexports passing through Th e Gam-
bia are destined for Senegal, with the other half continuing on to Guinea—the 
destination of about one-quarter of all Gambian reexports—Mali, Guinea- 
Bissau, and sometimes even Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. 
Benin and Nigeria
Th e modalities of importation of products intended for reexport to Nigeria 
vary by the nature of the commodity.3 Cross-border trade is controlled largely 
by sophisticated and well-organized networks and the large informal fi rms 
described in chapter 4, with many small operators involved on the margins. 
Th e trust and connections provided by these informal networks, oft en ethnic 
or religious in nature, facilitate market transactions spanning the continents 
and enable the provision of credit and transfer of funds, as seen in chapter 8. 
For bulk items such as rice, wheat, and sugar, importers purchase directly 
from international brokers with whom they are in regular contact. For some 
products such as cigarettes, the foreign companies have local representatives in 
Benin. Importers of second-hand goods such as used cars oft en travel abroad or 
have foreign correspondents, providing information about sourcing opportuni-
ties. A few large wholesalers dominate the imports of frozen poultry; COMON 
Company has about 60 percent of the market, employing 470 full-time workers, 
and CDPA-Agrisatch has some 20 percent of the market, with 150 full-time 
workers and another 300 part-time workers. Overall, traders display a remark-
able fl exibility in adapting to changing market opportunities.
A variety of trading networks linked by cultural, ethnic, or commercial ties 
operate in the reexport trade. Th ese include the Yoruba ethnic group, discussed in 
the previous chapter, centered in Porto Novo, which operates with a high degree 
of cohesion, thanks to ethnic and religious affi  nities, groups of women importers, 
and middlemen operating in the markets, again mostly women. Foreign traders 
are also engaged in the reexport business. Most of the descendants of the European 
trading houses have exited the scene, replaced by Lebanese and other Arabs, some 
of whom came from Nigeria along with Ibo refugees during the Biafra war, and 
Indians who began arriving from Ghana and Nigeria starting around 1970.
Unoffi  cial reexports can cross the border by land or water. By land, traders 
use numerous and ever-changing tracks along the long border with Nigeria. 
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Th ey also use a complex network of canals, with new canals being dug when 
customs agents patrol existing routes. Specialized warehouses for various goods 
destined for reexport are located in Cotonou and along the border. For example, 
warehouses specializing in wheat, rice, and other products are built and oper-
ated by brokers or private traders operating individually or in groups for their 
own use or are rented out to other traders. A network of markets dots both sides 
of the Benin-Nigeria border, with sister markets on either side of the frontier.
Th e parallel trade also runs from Nigeria to Benin. Nigeria has long been a 
supplier to its francophone neighbors of a large variety of agricultural and manu-
factured goods, imported from Asia, in the case of items facing low import bar-
riers in Nigeria, or produced locally in Nigeria. Th e largest unoffi  cial export by 
far from Nigeria to Benin is petroleum products, which are heavily subsidized in 
Nigeria, described in detail below. Imports from Nigeria have also been an impor-
tant source of capital and consumer goods in Benin and other CFA franc zone 
countries in the region. Products include fertilizer, machinery of various kinds, 
foodstuff s (corn and millet), plastic goods, spare parts, miscellaneous consumer 
goods such as dishes, cookware, soaps, school supplies, cosmetics, hardware, toys, 
scooters, and medicines (Galtier and Tassou 1998). Generic and low-cost phar-
maceuticals are produced in Nigeria with minimal regulation, so parallel imports 
from Nigeria are the source of cheap generic medicines in Benin for people who 
cannot aff ord to go to a licensed pharmacy. Some goods move in both directions 
at diff erent times and places, including bulk food items and textiles, depending 
on market conditions and Nigeria’s trade barriers.
Smuggling from Nigeria into Benin is intricately organized. Transport of goods 
by truck convoy is permitted under agreements between Beninese importers and 
high-level customs offi  cials in Nigeria, with a prearranged lump-sum payment 
per truck estimated to be equivalent to an ad valorem rate of 9–24 percent prior 
to 1997—well below the statutory import duties and other import taxes (Le Faou 
2001). Goods are also shipped to Benin illegally by boats using the complex sys-
tem of canals described earlier as well as by taxis hired for this purpose on both 
sides of the border. In February 1997, however, the Beninese authorities abruptly 
raised the lump-sum charge on trucks by 50 percent, resulting in a sharp reduc-
tion in the legal entry of goods in favor of illegal modes of entry. 
In recent years, imports of manufactured products into Benin from Nigeria 
have declined, supplanted by imports into Benin directly from China or indi-
rectly via Dubai. Petroleum imports are also down somewhat, as Nigeria has 
raised retail prices closer to those in Benin.
Th e unoffi  cial reexport trade operates in thinly disguised collusion with high 
government offi  cials in Nigeria. Th e highly lucrative reexport trade in cigarettes, 
for example, has been carried out by Nigerian trading groups under the protec-
tion of the Nigerian secret service (Hashim and Meagher 1999). In fact, in the 
case of used clothing and cigarettes, the dominant trading groups can deploy 
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the authorities to crack down on new entrants, preserving their control. Nige-
rian government involvement is also alleged to be profound in the all-important 
smuggling of petroleum products out of Nigeria. 
More detailed descriptions of cross-border trade in used cars and petroleum 
products illustrate these mechanisms.
Trade in Used Cars Used cars have been Benin’s most signifi cant reexport 
since about 2000.4 Chapter 4 describes the involvement of the large infor-
mal sector in this industry in Benin, as it is one of the most important arenas 
for these fi rms. Imports of vehicles have risen steeply from 50,000 in 1996 to 
200,000 in 2000 and to 250,000 in 2002 and 2003; aft er a dip in 2004–05 to 
about 150,000, they rose again to 200,000 in 2006, reaching an all-time high of 
300,000 in 2007. Perret (2002) estimates that used cars accounted for as much 
as 43 percent of all trade fl ows in 2001, up from 37 percent in 1999. Th is is con-
fi rmed by the fact that in 2001 used cars represented an astounding 45 percent 
of revenues (fees and taxes) for the port of Cotonou. Indeed the used car trade 
has become one of Benin’s major industries. Huge car parks on the outskirts of 
Cotonou employ an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people directly in importing, 
selling, storing, and driving and several thousand more indirectly. Th e value 
added generated by the distribution and handling of used cars was an estimated 
9 percent of Benin’s GDP in 2001, roughly the same as for cotton. 
About 90 percent of used cars imported into Benin are destined for Nigeria, 
with 5 percent for Niger and 5 percent for the domestic market. Th e bulk of used 
cars enter Benin in transit status, offi  cially manifested for Niger or other land-
locked countries. For instance, of 230,000 cars declared for shipment to Niger in 
2001, only 15,000 ended up there. Almost all the rest wound up in Nigeria. Th e 
fact that cars manifested for Niger and other landlocked countries are diverted 
to Nigeria is not concealed in Benin. Th ere is a well-established set of proce-
dures for obtaining documents from customs authorizing the diversion of cars 
to Nigeria. Th e fees and taxes for obtaining the authorizations amount to about 
CFAF 400,000 per car. Th is includes a fee for a customs escort to accompany the 
car to the Nigerian border. With the average cost, insurance, and freight value 
of a used car of about CFAF 1.0 million to CFAF 1.5 million, the taxes and fees 
for customs clearance alone amount to about 30 percent of the value of the car. 
Used car imports follow an elaborate and well-organized circuit. Import-
ers with connections in developed countries locate, purchase, and arrange for 
transportation of the cars. In 2001, 65 percent of the cars imported originated 
in Germany, with most of the rest coming from other European countries. Th e 
location of Beninese correspondents and the ease of port operations aff ect 
the preferred port of embarkation. Th e North American share has increased 
recently, but Europe remains the main source. Some of the importers own their 
own boats and are affi  liated with international shipping companies such as 
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Grimaldi. Others rent the boats. Customs clearance agents handle all of the 
paperwork and authorizations. As discussed in chapter 4, there is close coopera-
tion between formal and informal customs clearance agents. Other intermedi-
aries play a role in matching buyers and sellers of cars. Aft er the cars clear the 
port, they are stored in car parks in Cotonou before being driven to their des-
tination by companies specializing in the delivery of cars to the border, under 
escort from customs and with police permission. Th e cars are driven at night 
in convoys of about 100 cars. Th ey cross the border to Nigeria aft er paying 
bribes to both Beninese and Nigerian customs inspectors. Th e magnitude of 
the bribes is largely set by precedent, according to the custom clearance agents 
interviewed. Th e cars then receive valid license plates in Nigeria. In short, gov-
ernment offi  cials—from the highest to the lowest levels—on both sides of the 
border facilitate and benefi t from this trade.
Competition from Togo is increasing, with Togo charging lower fees for 
speedier service to off set Benin’s geographic advantage. In Togo, the paperwork 
takes only one day, and Togolese customs charges CFAF 200,000–CFAF 300,000 
per car. Competition from Togo was particularly acute around 2003–04, due to 
problems at the port of Cotonou. Nevertheless, these problems appear to have 
lessened, and Beninese traders do not seem overly worried about Togo, as the 
importation of used cars into Benin has picked up strongly since 2005.
Th e ample supply of aging vehicles in Europe and low incomes in West 
Africa provide a natural basis for trade in used cars. Imported cars averaged 
about 16 years of use upon arrival in Benin in 2001, with 95 percent more than 
10 years old. Toyota, Mercedes, and Peugeot cars have predominated, but the 
vehicles of other Japanese and European companies are increasingly prevalent. 
An accompanying market in spare parts has also fl ourished.
Nigeria’s ineff ective attempts to protect its own struggling car industry have 
diverted this trade to the parallel market. At the end of the 1970s, Nigeria assem-
bled 100,000 cars compared with a mere 10,000 today. In 1994, Nigeria banned 
imports of vehicles more than eight years old. In 2002, the law was further tight-
ened to ban all cars more than fi ve years old. In 2004, the ban was eased to 
apply again to cars more than eight years old. Moreover, any imports of cars by 
land routes, notably from Benin, are banned altogether. Th ese bans have, until 
recently, proved impervious to the porous border between the two countries, the 
strong demand for cheap vehicles, and the ambiguous attitudes of the authori-
ties in Nigeria. If Nigeria were either to liberalize its car market or to enforce the 
ban, as it has sporadically done, most recently in March 2008, this lucrative trade 
could suff er greatly or even collapse. 
Petroleum Product Imports from Nigeria Like the reexport trade from Benin to 
Nigeria, smuggling of petroleum products into Benin refl ects diff erential policies 
combined with the ease of slipping goods across the border and the complicity 
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of the two countries’ offi  cials. In this case, however, the main factors are the very 
large subsidies in Nigeria and partial deregulation of pricing in Benin, which 
together result in much lower consumer prices in Nigeria than in Benin (Moril-
lon and Afouda 2005). Smuggling of oil products into Benin began around 1980 
and increased dramatically in 2000. High-level offi  cials in both Nigeria and 
Benin are said to be intimately involved.
Nigeria, of course, is one of the world’s largest producers of crude oil, with 
export revenues highly dependent on world market prices, but its domestic 
consumer prices are largely delinked from world market trends. Nigerian refi n-
eries are provided with crude oil at prices far below those of the world mar-
ket, amounting to a subsidy of 20–30 percent. Due to the poor condition of 
its  refi neries, Nigeria imports gasoline, which is also sold at controlled prices. 
Moreover, Nigeria’s taxation of gasoline and diesel fuel is far below that of Benin 
and other countries in the region. In 2005, the cumulative taxation of gasoline in 
Benin approached 100 percent, counting import duties, excise taxes, and value 
added taxes, while taxes on oil products in Nigeria are low. 
Benin partially liberalized its petrol sector in 1995 as part of its structural 
adjustment policies. In 2000, retail prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene 
were raised by about 75 percent and have subsequently been adjusted in line 
with world oil prices. Th e 2000 price increase dramatically widened the gap 
between the offi  cial prices of these products in Benin and Nigeria, with prices 
in Benin more than double those in Nigeria between August 2000 and May 
2004, measured at the parallel exchange rate. In the last few years, Nigeria has 
raised its domestic prices, narrowing the diff erential between the offi  cial prices 
in Benin and Nigeria. In April 2008, Benin’s offi  cial price for unleaded gasoline 
was CFAF 470 per liter, about 50 percent above the price of 80 in Nigeria, or 
about CFAF 300 at the parallel exchange rate. Th e black market price of gasoline 
in Cotonou dropped sharply relative to the offi  cial price of gasoline following 
the June 2000 offi  cial price increases, whereas in 1997–99 the black market price 
tended to exceed the offi  cial price, refl ecting the scarcity of the product in the 
face of the controlled price. Th e black market prices of gasoline in Nigeria and 
Benin are nearly identical, at about 30 percent above Nigeria’s offi  cial price. In 
short, black market prices in Benin appear to be determined by a markup on 
Nigeria’s offi  cial price and have little connection to Benin’s offi  cial price. Th us 
the 2000 offi  cial price increases in Benin have had no sustained eff ect on black 
market prices (Morillon and Afouda 2005). 
Not coincidentally, offi  cial imports of gasoline and other petroleum products 
have dropped dramatically in Benin since 2000, despite continuing increases in 
the stock of vehicles in use in the country. Morillon and Afouda (2005) conse-
quently estimate that the share of gasoline supplied by informal imports from 
Nigeria rose from about 10 percent in 1998 and 1999 to about 50 percent in 2000 
and 83 percent in 2001 and 2002, tapering off  slightly to 72 percent in 2003–04. 
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In recent years, the share of smuggled petroleum products has declined slightly 
due to price increases in Nigeria. Th e share of smuggled gasoline has remained 
around 60–70 percent of Benin’s domestic consumption, but parallel imports of 
diesel and kerosene have dropped sharply. 
Although well above Nigeria’s offi  cial prices, Benin’s offi  cial retail petroleum 
prices are nonetheless considerably below those of other francophone countries 
in the region. For example, in March 2005, Benin’s price for regular gasoline 
was CFAF 360 per liter, compared to CFAF 415 in Togo, CFAF 470 in Niger, 
CFAF 522 in Burkina Faso, and CFAF 580 in Mali. Benin consequently also 
reexports a considerable portion of the gasoline and other petroleum products 
it imports from Nigeria, with unoffi  cial imports exceeding domestic usage by 
an undetermined magnitude.
Th e burgeoning informal market in Benin has been boosted further by 
the lack of offi  cial gas stations, which, in turn, refl ects the dominance of the 
informal market, with the zones bordering Nigeria, in particular, witnessing a 
decline in the number of operating service stations. In contrast, Nigeria has a 
very dense network of service stations, which readily supply the informal trad-
ers who smuggle gasoline into Benin.
Th e distribution network in Nigeria includes large wholesalers who have 
storage depots along the border holding up to 1,000 liters of gasoline. Th ese 
wholesalers have close political ties to high-level offi  cials in Nigeria. Wholesal-
ers sell to various intermediary distributors of various sizes who sneak gasoline 
across the border by pirogue, in cars whose gas tanks have been expanded, in 
small quantities on scooters, or on foot.
Th e net eff ect of this massive trade in petroleum products on Benin’s econ-
omy is complex. It entails a large loss of fi scal revenues but also constitutes a 
source of employment and income for traders and distributors, accounting in 
2005 for 1–2 percent of GDP and 15,000–40,000 jobs, depending on the method 
of estimation.
Causes of Smuggling: Differences in Import Protection 
and Other Distortions 
Golub and Mbaye (2009) and Oyejide et al. (2008) fi nd large and variable dif-
ferentials in retail product prices between Th e Gambia and Senegal and between 
Benin and Nigeria, confi rming the incentive to smuggle. For example, sugar 
prices are much higher in Senegal than in Th e Gambia. Diff erential shipping 
costs from Europe, North America, or Asia cannot be an explanatory factor, 
since the distance of shipping to Banjul versus Dakar or Contonou versus Lagos 
from any point of origin is virtually identical. If anything, shipping to Dakar 
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is cheaper, insofar as Dakar serves as a regional hub for some of the major 
shippers, and Lagos should benefi t from scale economies due to the size of the 
Nigerian economy.
Diff erences in national trade policies are widely recognized as a signifi cant 
factor (Egg and Herrera 1998). Th e effi  ciency and probity of trade facilitation, 
particularly port and customs operations, and the extent of border enforcement 
are also relevant.
Trade Policies 
Th e Gambia and Senegal As noted above, Th e Gambia’s relatively liberal trade 
policies in comparison to those of neighboring countries have undoubtedly 
contributed to Th e Gambia’s special role as a regional trading hub. Th e Gambia 
liberalized earlier and more aggressively than other countries of the region, 
most notably Senegal. Taxes on international trade in Th e Gambia and Senegal 
include customs duties, sales taxes, value added tax (VAT), fees, and special 
taxes on a few goods such as cigarettes. Th e import tax diff erential in the 1970s 
through the early 1990s between Senegal and Th e Gambia was very large, with 
Senegalese import duties alone as high as 100 percent for goods such as textiles, 
while Gambian duties averaged around 30 percent. 
Senegal’s Trade Policies Senegal followed highly restrictive trade and pricing 
policies during the fi rst decades following its independence in 1960s, with very 
high tariff s and opaque nontariff  barriers. As in much of Africa, Senegal moved 
toward more market-oriented economic policies as part of its structural adjust-
ment agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1980s 
and in the 1990s, following serious fi scal and fi nancial crises. Import barriers were 
liberalized somewhat starting in the late 1980s. Following the 1994 devaluation, 
import restrictions were signifi cantly lowered and simplifi ed, in particular with 
the elimination of variable levies (valeurs mercuriales) and quantitative restric-
tions, except for a few products, notably sugar. As also discussed in the case stud-
ies in chapter 4, the political clout of the Mimran family has resulted in sugar 
retaining extraordinarily high levels of protection, despite the general liberaliza-
tion of import barriers in Senegal since the 1980s. Th e downfall of several of the 
most powerful large informal entrepreneurs was linked to their alleged smug-
gling of sugar, a highly lucrative but risky venture. Implementation of the com-
mon external tariff  (CET) in WAEMU countries in 1998–2000 entailed further 
declines in trade taxes in Senegal, posing a new challenge for Th e Gambia’s role as 
an entrepôt and contributing to the impetus for substantial further liberalization. 
Th e CET dramatically reduced the infamous complexity and lack of transparency 
of Senegal’s tariff  structure by consolidating tariff s into four categories, with the 
top import duty rate, applicable to consumer goods, being 20 percent. 
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Gambian Trade Policies Up to the late 1990s, Th e Gambia’s trade regime was 
deliberately more liberal than those of its neighbors, particularly Senegal, but still 
involved considerable complexity and tariff  peaks, with rates of up to 90 percent 
and 27 tariff  bands (WTO 2004). In 2000, in response to the implementation of 
the WAEMU CET, Th e Gambia simplifi ed its customs duties to fi ve bands, with 
the highest carrying a rate of 20 percent, the same as the top rate in WAEMU. In 
2001, the number of bands was further reduced to four, and the top rate dropped 
to 18  percent (WTO 2004). In January 2006, Gambian customs duties were 
aligned with the ECOWAS common external tariff , resulting in an increase in 
some rates. Th e maximum rate, applicable to most consumer goods, was raised 
from 18 to 20 percent. At the same time, the sales tax on imports was increased 
from 10 to 15 percent, aligning it with the tax rate on domestic goods. 
Comparison Table 9.2 compares import taxes in Th e Gambia and Senegal as 
of end-2006 for some of the key goods said to be involved in the reexport trade, 
aggregating the various taxes listed above. In all cases, Senegal’s taxes are higher 
and sometimes much higher. Not surprising, the greatest diff erential is for sugar, 
where the Senegalese composite tax rate is about 80 percent above the Gambian 
Table 9.2 Trade Taxes in Senegal and The Gambia, 2007a 
tax rate (%) 
Product Gambia, The Senegal Difference
Flour 22.5 56.6 34.1
Sugar 22.5 103.8 81.3
Rice 16.8 22.7 5.9
Tomato paste 28.3 56.6 28.3
Cigarettes 58.0 97.7 39.7
Soft drinks 39.8 48.2 8.4
Milk (canned liquid) 22.5 44.8 22.3
Condensed milk 22.5 27.1 4.6
Cooking oil 22.5 56.6 34.1
Mayonnaise 39.8 44.8 5.0
Toilet soap 39.8 44.8 5.0
Candles 39.8 44.8 5.0
Matches 39.8 44.8 5.0
Tea 28.3 37.3 9.0
Canned sardines 39.8 44.8 5.0
Shoes 39.8 44.8 5.0
Fabric 39.8 44.8 5.0
Source: Customs data for The Gambia and Senegal; authors’ computations.
a. Includes sales taxes, fees, and other special taxes.
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tax rate. For fl our, tomato paste, cooking oil, and cigarettes, the diff erential is 
also quite high (25 to 40 percent). Th ese tax rate diff erences accord generally 
well with the price diff erences for these same items (Golub and Mbaye 2009). 
Benin and Nigeria Diff erential trade and taxation policies and practices are 
also the main cause of reexports between Benin and Nigeria, according to the 
available literature (Igué and Soulé 1992; Soulé 2004; Perret 2002; Morillon and 
Afouda 2005) and our interviews in the fi eld. 
Benin’s Trade Policies As in Th e Gambia, government revenues in Benin still 
depend heavily on taxation of international trade to a much greater extent 
than in other countries in Africa. Trade taxes account for more than half of 
tax receipts and about half of all government revenue. In 1973, Benin offi  cially 
adopted trade policies to foster the reexport trade, with the goal of maintaining 
lower import barriers than Nigeria. Like those of Senegal, Benin’s duties and 
taxes are largely set by WAEMU. Unlike in other WAEMU countries, the CET 
actually raised tariff  rates on average in Benin. Prior to the CET, Benin’s tariff s 
on consumer goods averaged 13.4 percent, far below the 30.0 percent plus rates 
of most other WAEMU countries, with only Togo somewhat closer to Benin, 
at 19.0 percent. With implementation of the CET, Benin’s overall average tar-
iff s rose slightly from 11.4 to 12.2 percent, whereas average tariff s for all other 
WAEMU countries fell substantially (World Bank 2005). Th e CET did little to 
diminish Benin’s reexports, however, given the continued very large diff erential 
with Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Trade Policies Nigeria’s trade policies have varied widely over time. 
Nigeria heavily protects some products, particularly those facing strong import 
competition, while subsidizing others, notably gasoline and other petroleum 
products. Nigeria’s import barriers have been among the highest in the world, 
as shown in table 9.3, with applied tariff s averaging nearly 30.0 percent in 2003 
and a signifi cant number of import prohibitions (IMF 2005; WTO 2005). Th e 
Nigerian manufacturing sector is unusually diversifi ed for Africa, but highly 
ineffi  cient, with capacity utilization rates usually well below 50 percent (IMF 
2005). Th e Nigerian government has sought to protect its struggling, but politi-
cally connected, domestic industrial and agricultural industries behind high 
import barriers.5 ECOWAS has been moving toward adoption of a common 
external tariff  with the same four-category structure of rates as WAEMU, but 
Nigeria has so far refused to accept this regime in its entirety. Nigeria also 
violates  ECOWAS’s provisions on free trade within West Africa. All imports 
from West Africa are required to enter Nigeria through the port of Calabar, 
and there are numerous checkpoints on the roads from Benin into southern 
Nigeria toward Lagos, 120 kilometers from the border. Nigeria’s import bans 
are applied to imports from Benin, even if the products are produced in Benin.
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Table 9.3 presents the recent evolution of Nigeria’s trade barriers on some of 
the key products involved in the reexport trade, illustrating the very high levels 
and variability of restrictions on imports. A long list of banned products varies 
from year to year. Th e extent to which these bans are enforced, however, also 
varies, and exemptions can be granted with the approval of the president. In 
short, Nigerian trade policy operates with an enormous complexity and opacity 
above and beyond the very high import barriers.
Trade Facilitation and Other Factors 
Trade barriers can explain much, but not all, of the diff erences observed in 
wholesale prices. Th is section considers other factors, including trade facilita-
tion, enforcement of border crossings, and currency exchange. 
Th e Gambia and Senegal 
Port Effi  ciency and Customs Practices Customs practices are as important as 
statutory customs duties. Th ese practices include customs valuation procedures 
and the speed and ease at which goods are cleared through the port and beyond. 
In Senegal, customs is said to engage in highly discretionary valuation prac-
tices. Senegalese customs apparently still applies reference pricing mechanisms 
to protect “sensitive goods,” such as matches, that are produced domestically, 
Table 9.3 Selected Import Barriers in Nigeria, 1995–2007 
tariff rates (%) or bans
Product 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Edible oil Banned Banned  55  40 Banned Banned Banned
Poultry meat Banned Banned  55  75 Banned Banned Banned
Beer Banned Banned 100 100 100 Banned Banned
Wine 100 100 100 100 100 20 20
Milk products  55  55  50  50 100 20 20
Tomato preserves  45  45  45  45  45 20 20
Used clothes Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned
Tires Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned
Wheat dough Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned
Used carsa Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned
Sugar  10  10  10  40 100 50 50
Cloth and apparel Banned  50  65  55 100 Banned Banned
Tobacco and cigarettes  90  90  80  80 100 50 50
Rice 100  50  50  75 110 50 50
Source: Soulé 2004; Nigerian customs data provided by the World Bank.
a. Defined as more than eight years old in 1994–2002, more than five years old in 2002–04, and more than 
eight years old since 2004.
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similar to, but less blatant than, the reference price maintained though the vari-
able levy on sugar. Th e Gambia’s customs services are relatively effi  cient in com-
parison to the more complex and bureaucratic procedures in Senegal. 
Another factor is the unusually effi  cient port of Banjul. Unlike other Afri-
can countries, including Senegal, the port of Banjul is known for its rapid and 
effi  cient clearance of goods. While merchandise can languish for days or even 
weeks in most African ports, including Dakar, clearance usually occurs within 
24 hours in Banjul. 
Th e Overall Business Climate Both Senegal and Th e Gambia benefi t from 
social harmony and relative political stability. But while Senegal suff ers from 
the legacy of a French-style highly bureaucratized system, Th e Gambia’s more 
laissez-faire tradition has contributed to the development of trading establish-
ments in Banjul. Ease of access to foreign exchange through the banking system 
in particular is a plus for Th e Gambia. In all of these areas, however, other coun-
tries are narrowing the gap with Th e Gambia. In some cases, Th e Gambia is at a 
disadvantage. For example, the tax rate on profi ts is 35 percent in Th e Gambia, 
while it has been lowered to 25 percent in Senegal. 
Relations with Senegal Senegal inevitably looms large in the Gambian  reexport 
business, given the country’s near-total enclosure within Senegal. For the same 
reason, economic relations with Senegal are critical. Yet relations with Senegal 
have not always been smooth, as noted in the introduction. Border disputes 
with Senegal can severely disrupt reexport trade. According to wholesalers, 
every signifi cant border confl ict with Senegal leads to a substantial drop in 
 reexports, and the subsequent recovery is always incomplete. Th e border dis-
pute following an increase in Gambian ferry fees in August 2005, when Senega-
lese truckers blockaded the border crossings in retaliation, contributed to the 
decline in reexports in 2006–07. While traders are, to some extent, able to avoid 
the offi  cial border crossings and slip across the frontier through the bush, the 
reexport trade was severely disrupted until the issue was resolved in October 
2005, when Th e Gambia rescinded the fee increases.
Currency Movements Depreciation of the Gambian dalasi vis-à-vis the CFA 
franc also aff ects the attractiveness of reexporting. Although the prices of 
imported goods are set in euros or U.S. dollars, and, therefore, free on board 
import prices are unaff ected by fl uctuations in the bilateral dalasi-CFA franc, 
the competitiveness of the transport services sector in Th e Gambia improves 
when the dalasi depreciates. Th e real depreciation of the dalasi in 2001–03 may 
explain some of the increase in reexports since 2001. According to traders, sub-
stantial exchange rate volatility is inimical to the reexport trade, as it makes 
arbitraging between markets more risky.
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Benin and Nigeria
Business Climate and Trade Facilitation Although far from perfect, Benin 
off ers a much friendlier climate for business and trade than Nigeria, where 
insecurity and crime are rampant, including at the ports. Th e port of Cotonou 
suff ers from signifi cant problems of corruption and weak infrastructure, but is 
superior to the ports in Nigeria. Clearance of goods is much faster, cheaper, and 
easier in Cotonou than in Nigerian ports. According to shippers, however, ports 
in Nigeria are improving, so this factor may become less signifi cant. 
Border Enforcement Benin has long had complex economic and political 
ties to Nigeria. Nigeria has made sporadic eff orts and threats to close down 
cross-border trade with Benin and has occasionally done so. Th e borders have 
sometimes been closed due to other political tensions between the two coun-
tries. From February 1984 to February 1986, Nigeria shut down the border with 
Benin in an eff ort to curb smuggling of petroleum products out of Nigeria. Dur-
ing this time, Nigeria closed down all service stations within 10 kilometers of 
the border with Benin in a futile attempt to curb smuggling. In 1996, President 
Abacha of Nigeria closed the border in a political dispute with Benin’s President 
Soglo related to the latter’s military cooperation with the United States, which 
Abacha viewed as a threat. Th e resulting dislocations in Benin, notably gaso-
line shortages, contributed to Soglo’s defeat in the 1996 presidential elections. 
In August 2003, the border was closed for a week following a confrontation 
between the Nigerian and Beninese government precipitated by the harboring 
of a Nigerian suspected criminal in Cotonou.6 Another brief, but disruptive, 
border closing occurred in 2005. In March 2008, Nigeria reportedly initiated a 
crackdown on imports of used cars, holding up car convoys at the usual crossing 
points such a Krake and Igolo.7 
Notwithstanding these occasional border closings and frequent threats from 
Nigeria, the reexport trade has always recovered as the enforcement of border 
controls reverts to its normal laxity. Nevertheless, Benin clearly is highly vul-
nerable to the vagaries of economic policy in Nigeria and could face serious 
diffi  culties if Nigeria adopts less-restrictive trade barriers or makes a serious 
eff ort to crack down on parallel trade. 
Exchange Rates and Convertibility Exchange rate changes themselves should 
not much alter the relative prices of importable goods from Asia or Europe in 
Benin versus Nigeria, since these prices are set in world markets and a change in 
the CFA franc–naira exchange rate should be refl ected in corresponding move-
ments of local currency prices in Benin and Nigeria. It can, however, aff ect the 
competitiveness of locally produced goods. In any event, the devaluation of 
the CFA franc in 1994 had little eff ect on the reexport trade beyond the short-
run disruptions it entailed. For a few months immediately following the 1994 
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devaluation, reexports dropped, but they recovered rapidly, and no clear change 
in the volume of reexports occurred between 1993 and 1994 (Galtier and Tas-
sou 1998, 129; Hashim and Meagher 1999). Th e eff ect of the devaluation of the 
CFA franc may also have been obscured by the subsequent sharp depreciation 
of the naira in the parallel market and the rapid increase of Nigerian infl ation.
Th e greater stability and liquidity of the CFA franc relative to the Nigerian 
naira has played a role in boosting Benin’s role as a trading center. Unlike the 
CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro and freely convertible into foreign cur-
rency within the CFA zone, the naira is highly volatile and subject to strict 
exchange controls, with a large black market. In 1993, however, when the CFA 
franc was made temporarily inconvertible outside of the franc zone, it had no 
lasting negative eff ect on the reexport trade.
Estimates of Unofﬁ cial Cross-Border Trade 
Offi  cial bilateral trade statistics from both Th e Gambia and Senegal report a 
tiny volume of bilateral trade between the two countries. According to these 
offi  cial statistics, Th e Gambia’s bilateral exports and imports with Senegal each 
accounted for only about 3.5 percent of Th e Gambia’s total exports and imports, 
respectively, over 2002–05, with Senegal having a bilateral surplus. Likewise, 
Benin’s trade data indicate that only about 15 percent of Benin’s exports and 
imports in recent years are with other members of the regional groups WAEMU 
and ECOWAS. In particular, Benin’s recorded exports to, and imports from, 
Nigeria are very low, averaging about 5 percent of its total offi  cial exports and 
imports between 2000 and 2005.
Th e offi  cial statistics, therefore, seem at variance with reality. By all accounts, 
there is a very large volume of reexports from Th e Gambia to Senegal and from 
Benin to Nigeria. But there are no reliable estimates of the volume of this trade. 
Th is situation is consistent with the fi ndings of Berg (1985), who concludes that 
the anomalies of African trade statistics are due mostly to smuggling.
Although there are no available data on unoffi  cial trade, estimates of the 
magnitude of reexports can be garnered by examining the pattern of imports 
of goods subject to large price distortions, under the assumption that these 
imports are recorded correctly at the port. One strategy is to compare imports 
to domestic consumption, but it is diffi  cult to estimate the latter. 
Th e IMF estimates of reexports in Th e Gambia amount to about four times 
the domestically produced exports or 80 percent of total exports, fi gures that are 
in line with the estimates of knowledgeable observers interviewed and Elhadj’s 
(2000) qualitative discussion. Golub and Mbaye’s (2009) fi ndings are similar for 
average levels of reexports, but show greater variation than the IMF estimates.
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Reexport products from Benin to Nigeria are dominated by a limited num-
ber of goods that are highly protected or banned in Nigeria, including those 
listed in table 9.4: bulk food items (rice, wheat, sugar), processed foods (tomato 
paste, condensed milk), frozen poultry, cigarettes, textiles and clothing, and 
used goods (cars, tires, and clothes). Most of these products have been main-
stays of the reexport trade since at least the 1970s, although variations have 
occurred in their relative importance in response to fl uctuations in the severity 
of Nigeria’s import restrictions.
Table 9.4 presents the values of imports over 2004–07 on 14 of the most 
important goods of Benin’s reexport trade. Importers in Benin estimate that 
70–90 percent of these goods are reexported illegally to Nigeria. Overall, table 
9.4 suggests that the reexport trade is very signifi cant relative to recorded 
imports, GDP, and government revenues. Imports of these 14 goods alone are 
greater than all offi  cially recorded imports reported in IMF and World Bank 
databases, largely because these databases exclude imported goods labeled as 
in transit. Duties collected on these 14 goods alone amounted to about 30 per-
cent of total government tax revenues over 2004–07. Th ese fi gures are consider-
ably above those suggested in much of the previous literature, such Galtier and 
Table 9.4 Imports in Benin, by Selected Reexport Items, 2004–07a
CFAF, billions
Product 2004 2005 2006 2007
Used cars 150.5 178.7 264.2 327.7
Rice 50.4 90.9 104.4 151.7
Textiles 44.7 60.1 57.0 82.9
Used clothes 27.8 32.7 41.9 48.9
Palm oil 9.1 9.0 27.1 44.4
Frozen poultry 29.7 26.0 23.6 38.5
Batteries 20.4 23.5 29.6 34.5
Furniture 4.7 6.6 14.5 28.6
Sugar 8.0 9.8 13.2 13.4
Clothing 4.1 10.7 2.3 8.8
Cigarettes 1.9 3.8 5.7 8.8
Prepared tomatoes 0.7 0.7 2.4 4.6
Used tires 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.5
Cardboard 4.3 4.2 3.7 3.1
Subtotal 359.7 460.9 593.9 800.2
Share of GDP (%) 22.4 23.6 26.6 32.4
Source: Customs data for Benin; authors’ calculations.
a. Includes goods imported in transit status. 
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Tassou (1998). According to Igué and Soulé (1992), however, reexports have 
at various earlier times amounted to more than half of recorded imports, for 
example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Signiﬁ cance of Informal Cross-Border Trade 
Th e contribution of the reexport trade to the economies of Benin and Th e 
Gambia is diffi  cult to measure, but is certainly large. Reexports account for 
about 80 percent of total exports for Th e Gambia. Net reexports (aft er deducting 
imports intended for reexport) contribute about 20 percent of foreign exchange 
earnings and 7 percent of GDP, below the contribution of tourism, but above 
that of groundnuts.8 Large numbers of people are employed in the handling, 
storage, and transport of goods. 
In Benin, reexports may be even more important. Perret (2002) estimates 
that trade in used cars alone accounts for 9 percent of Benin’s GDP—the same 
magnitude as for cotton. Given that used cars contribute about half of total 
unoffi  cial reexports, unoffi  cial trade generates perhaps 20 percent of Benin’s 
GDP. Its contribution to employment is less than its contribution to GDP, given 
that much of the latter consists of profi ts of importers and tax revenues, but it is 
still substantial, involving perhaps 50,000 people directly, of which about 15,000 
are in the used car market (Perret 2002). 
Th e most important contribution of the reexport trade is to government 
revenues. Indeed, as noted earlier, Benin’s and Th e Gambia’s trade policies have 
revolved around maximizing the income from reexports by taxing goods when 
they enter Benin at a rate well below those of their more protectionist neigh-
bors. Taxes on international trade represent about half of government revenues 
in both countries, with taxes on imports intended for reexport accounting for 
half or more of trade tax revenues. 
Harmonization of trade policies within WAEMU and ECOWAS poses a 
threat to the reexport business. Th e eff ect of the WAEMU CET in raising tariff s 
on consumer goods reduced Benin’s competitive advantage vis-à-vis Togo, and 
the prospect of Nigeria’s agreeing to lower its trade barriers is a major threat 
to the continued viability of smuggling. To counter the disincentive eff ects of 
trade liberalization by their neighbors, it is alleged that Beninese and Gambian 
customs offi  cials have at times endeavored to off set the rate increases by lower-
ing the declared taxable value of some merchandise. Essentially, a preferential 
regime is in eff ect for reexports relative to goods for local use. 
While Benin and Th e Gambia reap substantial revenue gains from reexports, 
a lot of smuggling almost completely escapes taxation. Moreover, these benefi ts 
are fragile, because reexports are subject to the vagaries of neighbors’ trade poli-
cies and the eff ectiveness of border controls. 
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It could be argued that smuggling serves a positive social function by under-
mining and circumventing distortions. Th e sustainability of trade strategies 
that prey on the distorted policies of neighbors is highly questionable, however. 
More generally, smuggling contributes to an acceptance of and even admiration 
for tax evasion and corruption in West Africa. 
Conclusion 
Th is chapter has examined cross-border smuggling between Senegal and 
Th e Gambia and between Benin and Nigeria. Th e volume of unrecorded and 
untaxed trade between neighboring countries in West Africa is very large. Th e 
causes of this trade are varied, but the main drivers are policy distortions that 
create price diff erentials across borders, combined with long-standing ethnic 
and religious ties that transcend national borders, as described in chapter 8, 
long porous borders, weak enforcement, and the involvement of infl uential 
political actors. Th e large informal fi rms described in chapter 4 are actively 
involved in cross-border trade.
As in other areas relating to the informal sector covered in chapter 6, reduc-
ing smuggling requires policy reforms that diminish the incentives promoting 
illegal behavior (in this case, further tariff  harmonization in the region), along 
with stronger state institutions (in particular, customs administration) that 
deter opportunistic behavior.
Notes 
 1. Togo also engages in reexport to Nigeria.
 2. Th is description is based on Lambert (1994), Boone (1989), and Rice (1967) as well 
as our interviews with traders and customs offi  cials in both Th e Gambia and Senegal 
in 2005. 
 3. Th is description is based on Igué and Soulé (1992) as well as interviews in Benin.
 4. Th is discussion of the used car market is based on Perret (2002) and interviews with 
traders and businesses involved in the import and sale of used cars.
 5. For example, it is alleged that the ban on poultry imports is related to former presi-
dent Obasanjo’s chicken farming business. 
 6. Th e case involved the killing of one of the nieces of then Nigerian president Obasanjo 
in a carjacking in Lagos. Th e carjacking ring stole cars in Nigeria and took them to 
Cotonou. Th e head of the carjacking ring, Tidjani Hamani, a Niger national, was 
based in Cotonou, where he was arrested and later released by the Benin judiciary. 
 7. “Diffi  cultés commerciales entre le Bénin et Le Nigeria: Embargo sur les véhicules 
d’occasion venues de Cotonou,” Le Matinal (Benin), March 14, 2008.
 8. IMF (2005). Th e contribution to GDP is based on the IMF’s estimate of “the margins 
added to the cost of imports to account for services provided by enterprises based in 
Th e Gambia.”
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